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 We modelled costs of a blow to an organism's head, and of a protective startle response.
 Cost-minimising startle response increases as a blow becomes more likely.
 Fear-potentiated startle is predicted by Bayesian inference on blow probability.
 Startle invigoration by reward anticipation is predicted by increased opportunity costs.
 This model makes predictions for a simpliﬁed neural implementation.
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a b s t r a c t
In many species, rapid defensive reﬂexes are paramount to escaping acute danger. These reﬂexes are
modulated by the state of the environment. This is exempliﬁed in fear-potentiated startle, a more
vigorous startle response during conditioned anticipation of an unrelated threatening event. Extant
explanations of this phenomenon build on descriptive models of underlying psychological states, or
neural processes. Yet, they fail to predict invigorated startle during reward anticipation and instructed
attention, and do not explain why startle reﬂex modulation evolved. Here, we ﬁll this lacuna by
developing a normative cost minimisation model based on Bayesian optimality principles. This model
predicts the observed pattern of startle modiﬁcation by rewards, punishments, instructed attention, and
several other states. Moreover, the mathematical formalism furnishes predictions that can be tested
experimentally. Comparing the model with existing data suggests a speciﬁc neural implementation of
the underlying computations which yields close approximations to the optimal solution under most
circumstances. This analysis puts startle modiﬁcation into the framework of Bayesian decision theory
and predictive coding, and illustrates the importance of an adaptive perspective to interpret defensive
behaviour across species.
& 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
The mammalian startle reﬂex is a protective postural change and
eye blink response. It occurs in response to a suspected immediate
blow to the head or upper body, as signalled by sudden noise, sharp
movement, or touch (Yeomans et al., 2002). Similar protective
reﬂexes are observed in non-mammalian species (Walters et al.,
1981). Startle responses are extremely rapid – with a motor output
delay of 5 ms (hindlimb in rats) to 10 ms (eye blink in humans)
(Yeomans et al., 2002). Despite this, they can be modulated by the
state of the environment. For example, after presentation of a
stimulus previously conditioned to predict an aversive event (a
conditioned stimulus, CSþ), the startle reﬂex to a subsequent startle
probe is increased (Brown et al., 1951) compared to startle reﬂex after
a CS-, a phenomenon termed fear-potentiated startle. This is found in
various species including aplysia (Walters et al., 1981), mice (Falls
et al., 1997), rats (Chi, 1965; Davis and Astrachan, 1978), rhesus
monkeys (Antoniadis et al., 2007) and humans (Grillon et al., 1991;
Grillon and Davis, 1997; Spence and Runquist, 1958). While the
underlying neural pathway is largely known in mammals (Rosen and
Davis, 1988; Walker and Davis, 1997a), formal approaches to explain
this observation have drawn on descriptive models of underlying
psychological states (Lang et al., 1990) or neurobiological proce-
sses (Ramirez-Moreno and Sejnowski, 2012). Yet, these models
neither explain the adaptive value of this behaviour nor can they
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accommodate all experimental observations. In particular, their
predictions are in contradistinction to the pattern of startle modula-
tion by reward and instructed attention commonly observed in
humans (Sabatinelli et al., 2001; Skolnick and Davidson, 2002; Lipp
et al., 1997, 1998). Here, we ﬁll this lacuna with a formal account of
the startle response in the framework of Bayesian decision theory
(Körding, 2007). This provides a formal model of the startle response
and its well established context sensitivity. Because the model is
based upon Bayesian optimality principles it is normative. Further-
more, biologically plausible implementations suggest themselves by
appeal to theories like predictive coding (Rao and Ballard, 1999).
The underlying idea of this model is that any organism must
maximise its ﬁtness. The objective of behaviour in a given situation is
therefore to minimise any cost that reduce ﬁtness. We make the
simple assumption that the startle response per se is adaptive by
protecting the organism from physical impact of a blow, and that
startle response is more effective in doing so when it is more vigorous
(Yeomans et al., 2002). Secondly and crucially, we assume that the
organism assigns a common cause to physical manifestations of
danger. That is to say, the organism infers from the likely presence
of aversive events such as electric shocks used in experimental
paradigms to the likely presence of other threats such as a blow to
the head, because both are assumed to be manifestations of the same
cause. This non-speciﬁcity is normative in environments in which
manifestations of physical danger are correlated. To simplify presenta-
tion in the Results/Discussion, a blow is assumed to be either present
or absent. This well reﬂects most experimental manipulations dis-
cussed in the paper. To account for more realistic biological scenarios,
the appendix contains a generalisation for a continuous (scalar) blow
magnitude which replicates all results from the discrete model.
2. Model
2.1. Model outline
When suspecting a blow, the objective of an adaptive organism is
to minimise its impact on ﬁtness, and we can quantify this impact
using cost functions. We unpack total cost CTOT into two types: costs of
the blow CB, and costs of the startle response itself, CR. If startle
response itself had no cost, the organism should always exhibit the
largest possible startle magnitude, in order to minimise the cost of the
blow; because this is not the case (Yeomans et al., 2002), there must
be a cost to the response. Each of these two cost terms can be further
unpacked into direct costs Cd and costs due to foregone opportunities
Cf. CB;d rð Þ quantiﬁes the direct cost of a blow (e.g. tissue damage)
which depends on the startle response magnitude r because startle is
assumed to be more effective when it is more vigorous. CR;d rð Þ is the
direct (metabolic) cost of the startle response which also depends on
its magnitude as it consumes more energy when the response is more
vigorous. Opportunity costs, on the other hand, are the potential
beneﬁts foregone due to interruption of ongoing behaviour, either
through the startle response itself, CR;f rð Þ, or because of the physical
impact of the blow, CB;f rð Þ. We assume all costs combine additively
(assumption 1), and treat the blow B from the perspective of the agent
as Bernoulli-distributed random variable – i.e. it will either occur or
not. Success probability of this random variable is PðBjXÞ, i.e. the
probability of a blow B, given the current sensory input X which
includes the startling stimulus S. According to decision theory, the
organism needs to minimise total cost, which is the sum of startle
response cost, and expected cost of the blow to the organism. Here h iP
denotes the expectation under PðBjXÞ
CTOT ðrÞ ¼ CR rð Þþ CB rð Þ
 
P ¼ CR rð ÞþPðBjXÞCB rð Þ
¼ CR;d rð ÞþCR;f rð Þ
 þPðBjXÞ CB;d rð ÞþCB;f rð Þ
 
:
2.2. Assumptions
2.2.1. Assumption 1
All costs combine additively and are fully known to the agent.
This is the only assumption that bears on the structure of the
model; the following assumptions constrain the behaviour of the
model but not its structure.
2.2.2. Assumption 2
Increasing startle response reduces direct cost of a blow but not
the probability of a blow:
d
dr
CB rð Þo0;
P Bj r;Xð Þ ¼ P BjXð Þ:
2.2.3. Assumption 3
Changing the utility of foregone opportunities linearly scales the
opportunity cost functions by a factor η
CnTOT rð Þ ¼ CR;d rð Þþ CB;d rð Þ
 
PþηCR;f rð Þþη CB;f rð Þ
 
P :
The change in opportunity cost thus only depends on the
changing utility of the current action that the startle response,
or the blow, would interrupt. This is based on the biological
assumption that changing the utility of this action does not change
the probability of performing it successfully.
2.2.4. Assumption 4
The relative increase in opportunity cost of the startle response is
smaller than the relative decrease in opportunity cost of the blow
when startle response is increased:
d
dr
CR;f rð Þ

o
d
dr
CB;f rð Þ

:
d
dr
CR;f rð Þ40:
d
dr
CB;f rð Þo0:
This assumption is required to explain the impact of increasing
opportunity cost on startle response (Section 2.4). Globally this is
biologically reasonable: a maximum magnitude startle response
interrupts ongoing behaviour for a shorter time than a blow in the
absence a startle response. Hence, the maximum opportunity cost
of the startle is smaller than the maximum opportunity cost of the
blow. Here, we need to stipulate that this relation is given locally
over the entire range of startle responses and expected blow
magnitudes to which the model is applied.
From this assumption, it follows that for all ror0:
CR;f rð Þþ CB;f rð Þ
 
P4CR;f r0ð Þþ CB;f r0ð Þ
 
P :
2.3. Impact of increasing blow probability
When we increase the blow probability P BjXð Þ to Pn BjXð Þ, the
global minimiser for CnTOT , r
n
0, must be larger than, or equal to, the
current minimiser for CTOT, r0: rn0Zr0.
Proof. Assume some ror0. We show that this cannot be a
minimiser for CnTOT . □
First, we expand the total cost for the new blow probability
(star notation indicates the situation with increased blow prob-
ability)
CnTOT ðrÞ ¼ CR rð Þþ CB rð Þ
 
Pn ¼ CR rð ÞþP
n BjXð Þ=P BjXð Þ CB rð Þ
 
P
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¼ CTOT rð Þþ Pn BjXð Þ=P BjXð Þ1
 
CB rð Þ
 
P ¼ CTOT rð ÞþzCB rð Þ;
where z¼ Pn BjXð ÞP BjXð Þ. Because r0 is a global minimiser,
CTOT rð Þ4CTOT r0ð Þ for all rar0. Hence
CTOT rð ÞþzCB rð Þ4CTOT r0ð ÞþzCB rð Þ:
Now Pn BjXð Þ4P BjXð Þ and therefore, z40. Also, by Assumption 2,
dCB rð Þ=dro0 and therefore CB rð Þ4CB r0ð Þ for ror0. Hence
CTOT r0ð ÞþzCB rð Þ4CTOT r0ð ÞþzCB r0ð Þ:
Undoing the substitution, we obtain
CTOT r0ð ÞþzCB r0ð Þ ¼ CnTOT r0ð Þ:
To summarise
ror0 ) CnTOT rð Þ4CnTOT r0ð Þ:
This means that no ror0 can be a global miminiser for CnTOT .
Therefore the new global minimiser must be some rn0Zr0.
2.4. Impact of increasing cost of foregone opportunities
When we increase opportunity cost, the new global minimiser
for CnTOT , r
n
0, must be larger than, or equal to, the current minimiser
for CTOT, r0: rn0Zr0.
Proof. Assume ror0. We will show that this cannot be a mini-
miser for CnTOT . □
First, we can expand the total cost for the situation with higher
opportunity cost (indicated by star notation), using Assumption 3
with η41:
CnTOT rð Þ ¼ CR;d rð Þþ CB;d rð Þ
 
PþC
n
R;f rð Þþ CnB;f rð Þ
D E
P
¼ CR;d rð Þþ CB;d rð Þ
 
Pþη CR;f rð Þþ CB;f rð Þ
 
P
	 

¼ CTOT rð Þþ η1
 
CR;f rð Þþ CB;f rð Þ
 
P
	 

4CTOT r0ð Þþ η1
 
CR;f rð Þþ CB;f rð Þ
 
P
	 

4CTOT r0ð Þþ η1
 
CR;f r0ð Þþ CB;f r0ð Þ
 
P
	 

¼ CnTOT r0ð Þ;
from Assumption 4, and because η41. To summarise
ror0 ) CnTOT rð Þ4CnTOT r0ð Þ
This means that no ror0 can be a global miminiser for CTOT.
Therefore the new global minimiser must be some rn0Zr0.
2.5. Bayesian analysis of the fear-potentiated startle paradigm
If a sensory input X is comprised by a CSþ and a startle
stimulus S, we have, by Bayes' theorem
PðBjX ¼ S;CSþf gÞ ¼ PðX ¼ fS;CSþgjBÞPðBÞ
PðX ¼ fS;CSþgÞ :
Under the simplifying assumption that the agent believes CSþ
and S are independent: pðX ¼ fS;CSþgÞ ¼ pðSÞpðCSþÞ, and there-
fore
PðBjX ¼ S;CSþf gÞ ¼ PðSjBÞPðCSþjBÞPðBÞ
PðSÞPðCSþÞ
¼ PðSjBÞPðBjCSþÞ
PðSÞ :
In other words, the probability of a blow under the current
sensory input depends on the probability of a blow given the CSþ .
This is the quantity that changes by fear conditioning.
Also
PðBjX ¼ :S;CSþf gÞ ¼ Pð:SjBÞPðBjCSþÞ
Pð:SÞ  0;
because
Pð:SjBÞ  0:
This means that if the CSþ is presented without the startle
stimulus S, then the probability of a blow is close to zero, because
the probability of no startle stimulus when there is an immediate
blow is almost zero. The last equation reﬂects the biological
observation that animals show no startle responses in the absence
of startle stimuli, and from this it follows animals should not
startle when the CS is presented on its own.
3. Results
We ﬁrst consider the startle response on its own. According to
decision theory, the organism needs to minimise the cost of the startle
response, plus the expected cost of a blow: CTOT ¼ CRþPðBjXÞCB.
Expected cost of a blow is the second term in the sum – the product of
blow probability and blow cost. Crucially, if the blow probability
pðBjXÞ becomes higher, the cost-minimising startle magnitude
increases (Section 2.3). Hence, if a stimulus X2 is more likely to signify
a blow than another stimulus X1, then PðBjX2Þ4PðBjX1Þ - and
therefore, the cost-minimising startle response is more vigorous for
X2 than for X1. In biological terms, this predicts for example that a
louder noise which is more likely to signify a blow also elicits a
stronger startle response, because this is cost-minimising under the
model, in line with experimental observations (Dawson et al., 2008).
How does the organism estimate pðBjXÞ, the probability of a
blow, given its sensory inputs? Is it ﬁxed, learned by experience, or
inferred from other available variables? This question can be
addressed by analysing the fear-potentiated startle paradigm
(Brown et al., 1951). Here, an animal is trained to associate a
sensory stimulus (conditioned stimulus, CSþ) with an aversive
outcome (unconditioned stimulus, US). After this association is
established, a startling sensory stimulus S is presented at some
time during the CSþ . As a rule, startle magnitude is higher in this
situation than in the presence of a CSwhich is predictive of US
omission. In our model, this change in startle magnitude can only
be explained if PðBjX ¼ fS;CSþgÞ4PðBjX ¼ fS;CSgÞ. But this
inequality could not arise if pðBjXÞ was ﬁxed: the assignment of
CSþ and CS is entirely arbitrary. Hence, we can exclude this ﬁrst
possibility for establishing PðBjXÞ. Secondly, if PðBjXÞ was learned
by experience, the animal would have to experience the startling
stimulus in the presence of the CSþ and CS (i.e. fS;CSþg and
fS;CSg) at least once before a difference between pðBjX ¼
fS;CSþgÞ and pðBjX ¼ fS;CSgÞ could arise. But training the CS–
US association changes startle magnitude on the ﬁrst startle trial
after learning, in the absence of any previous experience with the
combination of startle stimulus and CS. Hence, PðBjXÞ cannot be
learned by experience. As a third possibility, we can use Bayes'
theorem and unpack this probability into PðBjXÞ ¼ PðX jBÞPðBÞ=PðXÞ.
Formally, PðBjXÞ is a backward model of possible scenarios, given
sensory input, and PðX jBÞ is a forward model of which sensory
input to expect, given a particular scenario. Unpacking the back-
ward model in this way, and rearranging terms, PðBjX ¼ fS;CSþgÞ
depends on PðBjCSþÞ (Section 2.5). Hence, if the organism has
learned that CSþ predicts US and assigns this US to a process also
causing a threat B, this will increase PðBjCSþÞ and thereby increase
PðBjXÞ. In this case, the expected cost of the blow will increase, and
hence, the cost-minimising startle response. In other words, startle
potentiation after a CSþ that predicts a physical impact (fear-
potentiated startle) normatively arises from Bayesian decision
theory. At the same time, one can show that startle magnitude will
be near-zero (i.e. no startle response will be elicited) if the CSþ is
presented without the startle-eliciting stimulus (Section 2.5).
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This model also makes another prediction. If we write
PðBjXÞ ¼ PðX jBÞPðBÞ=PðXÞ, then the prior probability P(B) does not
depend on current sensory input X and can be estimated from past
experience. Hence, if P(B) is increased before the startle probe
occurs, startle response can be increased in the absence of “fear-
eliciting” sensory input at the moment of startle elicitation. Experi-
ments that manipulate the prior probability P(B) have accumulated
evidence in favour of this prediction. Startle potentiation is seen in
trace fear conditioning (Burman and Gewirtz, 2004), contextual fear
conditioning (Campeau et al., 1991; Grillon and Davis, 1997), after
prior exposure to foot shocks (Hitchcock et al., 1989), and during
instructed fear in humans (Grillon et al., 1993). All these manipula-
tions increase P(B) before the startle probe, X, occurs. Further, our
model explains a number of related phenomena which are often
framed in psychological or ethological terms. For rats, a crepuscular
(twilight-active) species, bright light is associated with danger –
and also increases startle magnitude (Walker and Davis, 1997b),
while for diurnal humans, darkness is associated with danger and
increases startle magnitude (Grillon et al., 1997). In humans,
imagination of negative events (Vrana and Lang, 1990; Vrana,
1995; Cook et al., 1991) and the anticipation of negative pictures
(Sabatinelli et al., 2001) increase startle. Two seconds or longer after
onset of negatively valenced pictures in humans, startle to visual
and auditory probes is increased (Sabatinelli et al., 2001; Vrana et
al., 1988; Bradley et al., 1990; Codispoti et al., 2001). In our model, it
is not the psychological valence of these pictures that matters but
their property of predicting physical danger, i.e. increasing P(B). In
line with this, negative picture viewing only increases startle if
pictures are rated high in subjective arousal (Cuthbert et al., 1996)
or explicitly depict situations of physical threat (Bradley et al.,
2001). On the other hand, a few seconds after onset of positively
valenced images (Sabatinelli et al., 2001; Vrana et al., 1988; Bradley
et al., 1990; Codispoti et al., 2001),startle magnitude is reduced – in
our model this follows from a smaller prior probability of a blow.
Up to here, our model makes similar predictions to a psycho-
logical “motivational priming” model (Lang et al., 1990) according
to which motivational states amplify compatible reﬂexes and
reduce incompatible ones. In this model, startle reﬂex is seen to
be compatible with negative but not positive motivational state;
hence it is ampliﬁed by punishments but reduced by gains.
However, our predictions crucially diverge from this model when it
comes to the impact of reward anticipation and top-down (instructed)
attention. In a motivational priming model, both reward anticipation
and collection of reward imply motivational states which are incom-
patible with startle reﬂex and should therefore reduce startle magni-
tude. In order to analyse these situations in our model, we need to
consider opportunity costs. Clearly, a startle response interrupts the
organism such it might forego a reward at the same time – this
imposes an opportunity cost. However, the impact of physical danger
might interrupt the organism for much longer such that beneﬁt of
foregone opportunities will typically be higher. Crucially, by Assump-
tion 4, the relation between startle magnitude and startle opportunity
cost, CR;f , is less steep than the relation between startle magnitude and
opportunity cost due to the blow, CB;f . This is illustrated in Fig. 1 and
implies that increasing opportunity cost increases the optimal startle
magnitude if probability of a blow is constant (Section 2.4). Anticipa-
tion of reward in humans increases opportunity cost – because the
rewarding event might be missed – and hence can increase cost-
minimising startle magnitude. In line with this prediction, anticipating
positive pictures or ﬁnancial gains in humans increases startle
magnitude (Skolnick and Davidson, 2002; Sabatinelli et al., 2001).
Here, predictions from our model are entirely different from previous
models which do not take into account opportunity cost. Equally, there
is an opportunity cost to missing a stimulus that one is instructed to
attend. There is experimental evidence that in this situation, startle
magnitude is increased over and above modality-speciﬁc effects of
attentional gain (Lipp et al., 1998, 1997). Note that these predictions
depend on a constant probability of a blow. However we have argued
that positively valenced stimuli decrease the prior probability of a
blow, p(B). If they also increase opportunity cost, optimal startle
magnitude increases only if the increased opportunity cost outweighs
the impact of reduced danger, and this is difﬁcult to establish in the
aforementioned studies. Much clearer evidence for our model comes
from an experiment on food stimuli. For satiated subjects, food stimuli
decrease the prior probability of danger and thus decrease optimal
startle magnitude. For food-deprived subjects, however, these visual
signals predict reward (the possibility of eating food) and increase
opportunity cost. This may increase optimal startle response. Indeed,
this dissociation has experimentally been observed (Drobes et al.,
2001).
While the startle potentiation circuit is well-characterised
(Walker and Davis, 1997a), there is not much research that could
help elucidate the computations embedded in this modulatory
circuit. However, one study suggests that it is not simply P(B) or
PðBjCSþÞ which is being signalled. Davis and Astrachan found that
conditioning rats with a footshock as US increases startle magnitude
after the CSþ across the board, in keeping with previous evidence
and with our model. However, training with a very high-magnitude
footshock US increased startle less than conditioning with medium-
magnitude footshock US (Davis and Astrachan, 1978). This can be
framed in an extended model (see Appendix) which takes into
account the scalar blow magnitude b. After a CSþ predicting a very
high magnitude footshock, the organismwould, in this model, expect
a stronger blow than after a CSþ signalling a medium-blow
footshock, both with the same probability. The observed pattern of
startle potentiation can arise if Assumption 2 from the appendix is
violated, i.e. if there is a range of very high b over which startle is less
effective at reducing cost than at lower values of b. Biologically this
could mean that a startle response is a less efﬁcient response for very
strong than for medium blow magnitudes.
Crucially, any modulatory pathway should in principle encode
the full probability distribution over blow magnitudes, pðB¼ bÞ, to
be incorporated with the bivariate cost function CBðs; bÞ. Yet, this
does not seem to be the case. In the aforementioned study, during
extinction in the medium-footshock group, startle magnitude con-
sistently decreased, as would be predicted in our model by a
progressive decrease in P(B) under extinction. However, in the
high-footshock group, startle magnitude ﬁrst increased during
extinction and then decreased again. This is not optimal behaviour:
if startle response is inefﬁcient to protect from a strong blow that is
very likely, it does not become more efﬁcient for the same strong
blow when it is less likely. This ﬁnding can only be understood if an
expectation of blow magnitude, rather than its probability distribu-
tion, is combined with the cost function. This could occur in the
modulatory pathway encoding p(B) but also in the startle-eliciting
node encoding pðBjXÞ. Encoding an expectation rather than a
probability distribution is sparse. Such simpliﬁed computations
have also been observed in motor decisions (Fleming et al., 2013).
This algorithmwill produce close approximations to optimal startle
magnitude over regions where Assumption 2 from the appendix is
fulﬁlled. Otherwise, this simpliﬁed architecture comes at the
expense of performance in this circuit. Surprisingly little is known
about startle modiﬁcation under reward-induced states in animals,
such that no predictions for neural implementation of opportunity
cost minimisation is currently possible.
4. Discussion
In this paper, we presented a normative approach to startle
modulation, by formalising the consequences of a startle response
as costs, and analysing the cost-minimising behaviour. Under the
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assumption that startle is adaptive by reducing the impact of a
potential blow, we ﬁnd that the general structure of the model is
able to capture startle modulation by different startle probes.
Crucially, using a Bayesian approach to unpack the probability of a
blow, this model can account for the well-established phenomenon
of fear-potentiated startle (Brown et al., 1951) in which a startle
probe is combined with a CSþ that predicts an aversive outcome.
The model generalises this situation to other situations inwhich the
prior probability of a blow is increased from the perspective of an
organism, but in which no “fear-eliciting” stimulus is presented at
the time of the startle probe. Importantly, by considering opportu-
nity costs, the model makes the prediction that anticipation of
rewards, and instructed attention, can increase startle reﬂex. This is
in keeping with experimental observations and in contradistinction
to previous models which could not account for this phenomenon
(Lang et al., 1990). To summarise, almost all behavioural observa-
tions on startle modiﬁcation follow normatively from the presented
model. Because the model formalises selective pressures in terms of
costs, it also explains why this behaviour evolved.
Mathematical models in neuroscience can be broadly classiﬁed
according to Marr's three levels of analysis (Marr and Poggio, 1976):
computational – the problem to be solved, algorithmic – by which
algorithm the problem is solved, implementation – how this is
biophysically encoded in neural circuits. Our model is on a compu-
tational level: we show which behaviour solves the problem of
cost-minimisation under some constraints but not by which algo-
rithm or in which neural circuits the organism solves this problem
on-line. However, one can make some predictions about neural
implementation. An important conceptual difference between our
model and previous psychological models (Lang et al., 1990) is
that in our model, startle modiﬁcation does not require a central
motivational state – the required computations can be implem-
ented locally (LeDoux, 2014). More speciﬁcally, startle reﬂex is
instantiated in a minimal brain stem circuit, and modulatory inﬂu-
ences impact on this circuit. These modulatory inﬂuences are well-
characterised for potential punishments. Input from the basolateral
nucleus of the amygdala (BLA) appears to be crucial for modulation
in danger states (Walker and Davis, 1997a). This information is
relayed to the BLA from central nucleus of the amygdala in
conditioned fear (Walker and Davis, 1997a), and from bed nucleus
of the stria terminalis in bright light exposure of rats, and antici-
patory anxiety (Walker et al., 2003). Intracerebroventricular infu-
sion of the stress hormone corticotropin-releasing factor, CRF,
increases startle magnitude in rats (Swerdlow et al., 1986; Liang
et al., 1992). Physiological CRF release is seen under acute threat, so
this hormone might signal an increased prior probability of a blow
as well, although it is not yet known whether this impact is also
mediated by the BLA. To summarise, these results strongly sug-
gest that the BLA is crucial in signalling modulatory inﬂuences to
the brain stem startle circuit. The observation that decreasing the
Fig. 1. Examples for cost functions and change of parameters. (A) Startle cost (light grey) increases with increasing startle magnitude, while expected cost of a blow (dark
grey) decreases with increasing startle magnitude. They are added into a total cost function (black), and this is minimized to determine optimal startle magnitude.
(B) Increasing blow probability scales the expected cost of blow and increases the minimiser for the total cost function – hence, optimal startle magnitude is increased. Blow
probability given sensory input can, by Bayes theorem, be increased via increased prior probability of a blow (see text). (C) Opportunity costs are potential beneﬁts, foregone
due to the startle response (dotted light grey) or due to the blow (dotted dark grey). They are combined with the direct costs to give a total cost function (black).
(D) Increasing the potential beneﬁts scales the opportunity cost function. This shifts the minimising startle magnitude towards higher values – provided that the opportunity
costs of startle have shallower slope than the opportunity costs of the blow, a biological meaningful assumption (see text).
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probability of very high-magnitude footshock in rats can increase,
rather than decrease, startle magnitude (Davis and Astrachan, 1978)
appears to follow from a simpliﬁed neural architecture in which a
modulatory pathway signals blow expectation rather than a full
probability distribution of blows. This circuit produces near-optimal
results under the condition that higher startle magnitude is more
efﬁcient at reducing blow cost, but becomes clearly suboptimal if
that condition is not fulﬁlled.
Besides explaining existing observations, the model also makes
additional testable predictions. Speciﬁcally, startle magnitude is
assumed to be monotonically related to the probability of a blow,
which is easy to test experimentally by varying the probability of
danger - for example by probabilistic punishment schedules in a
fear conditioning task. Also, startle magnitude is assumed to
monotonically relate to opportunity costs.
Our model makes few assumptions. One assumption that bears
on the structure of the model is that costs combine additively. The
remaining assumptions impact the behaviour of the model and
can be analysed within the given model structure. We have
already highlighted one example in which Assumption 2 appears
to be violated under extreme circumstances, and it should be
straightforward to test the range of startle and blow magnitudes
under which the assumptions are fulﬁlled.
A crucial biological assumption we make in the case of fear-
potentiated startle is that the organism assigns aversive events such
as an electric shock to a common cause also predicting a threaten-
ing blow. This assumption in itself is normative in environments in
which different manifestations of physical threat are correlated. It
remains to be shown whether this generalisation also occurs for
danger manifestations that are typically not correlated in biological
environments, for example threat of predation and threat of
conspeciﬁc attack. This would educe whether startle potentiation
is an evolved mechanism adaptive in highly complex environments,
or whether its unspeciﬁcity is due to constraints on the complexity
of the neural system. Such constraints are apparent in simple
species, e.g. aplysia, in which fear-potentiated startle can be found.
Finally, the model focuses on determining the optimal startle
magnitude independent of other actions. It is possible that startle
response is selected from a larger action repertoire, and in this
case there might be interactions between the cost functions
related to startle, and to other actions. Selection between, for
example, startling and freezing may explain the aforementioned
observation that during fear conditioning with very high electric
shocks, startle potentiation is smaller than with medium shocks.
In the case of fear-potentiated startle, our model bases optimal
startle magnitude on Bayesian inference. This ﬁts into a class of
theories about the “Bayesian Brain” postulating that the brain in
general uses probabilistic inference and stores forward models and
prior probabilities to compute optimal behaviour using Bayes'
theorem (Pouget et al., 2013). In terms of neurobiological implemen-
tation, this form of the model lends itself to implementation through
predictive coding (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Dayan and Hinton, 1996).
This is important because there is a growing literature on such
implementation schemes, one of them being active inference. In this
scheme, the cost functions above are casted as prior beliefs, and then
the Bayes optimal expression of a startle response can be expressed
as a pure inference problem of the sort solved by Bayesian ﬁltering.
The functional anatomy reviewed above may then be understandable
in terms of Bayesian belief updating of the sort associated with
hierarchical message passing in the brain (Bastos et al., 2012).
To summarise, the presented model furnishes a novel perspec-
tive upon the context sensitivity of startle reﬂex and arranges
empirical ﬁndings in a computational framework. By doing so, it
furnishes an exemplary approach to bridging an empirical and
theoretical gap between human emotion psychology, and animal
neuroscience. Thus, it may pave the way towards a cross-species
and computational perspective upon emotion neuroscience.
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Appendix A. Model for scalar blow magnitude
A.1. Assumptions
A.1.1. Assumption 1
All costs combine additively and are fully known to the agent
(Table A1).
A.1.2. Assumption 2
Startle is more effective in reducing expected cost at high expected
blow magnitude than at lower expected blow magnitude:
Bh ipn4 Bh ip )
d
dr
CB rð Þ
 
pno
d
dr
CB rð Þ
 
p;
Table A1
Variables and notation in the model for scalar blow magnitude.
Variable Explanation
r Scalar magnitude of startle response
B¼ bAB Continuous random variable, denoting scalar magnitude of blow to the organism
X Sensory information at the time of the startle response
p bjXð Þ Probability density function over blow magnitudes, given sensory information
pð1 .. nÞ B¼ bjXð Þ Set of p.d.f.s describing all possible scenarios of conditional blow expectations
pn B¼ bjXð Þ P.d.f for which Bh ipn4 Bh ip
h ip Expectation under p BjXð Þ:
R
bABdb ð Þp BjXð Þ
h ipn Expectation under pn BjXð Þ:
R
bABdb ð Þpn BjXð Þ
CR;d rð Þ Direct metabolic cost of startle response
CR;f rð Þ Cost of opportunities foregone due to the startle response
CB;d r; bð Þ Direct physical cost of the blow
CB;f r; bð Þ Cost of opportunities foregone due to the blow
CR rð Þ ¼ CR;d rð ÞþCR;f rð Þ Overall startle response cost
CB s;bð Þ ¼ CB;d r;bð ÞþCB;f r; bð Þ Overall blow cost
CTOT ðsÞ ¼ CR rð Þþ CB r; bð Þ
 
p
Total cost
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d
dr
CB rð Þ
 
po0;
where the star indicates the situation with higher expected blow
magnitude. This generalises Assumption 2 in the main text. It
constrains the combinations of cost functions and probability
distributions that are allowed in the model. Consider the more
general relation
∂
∂r
CB;d r; bð Þo0;
∂
∂b
∂
∂r
CB;d r; bð Þo0;
which states that startle is more effective at higher startle
magnitudes, and is more or equally effective in reducing cost at
higher blow magnitudes. Assumption 2 follows from these rela-
tions for example in the following two special cases:
 a cost function derivative ð∂=∂rÞCB r; bð Þ concave and increasing
in b, combined with any set of probability distributions for B
 a set of p.d.f.s pð1 .. nÞ BjXð Þ with the same shape and variance
but different mean (e.g. Gaussian p.d.f.s)
From Assumption 2, it follows for all ror0:
CB rð Þ
 
pn  CB r0ð Þ
 
pn4 CB rð Þ
 
p CB r0ð Þ
 
p:
Rearranging this inequality, we obtain
CB rð Þ
 
pn  CB rð Þ
 
p4 CB r0ð Þ
 
pn  CB r0ð Þ
 
p:
In other words, the effect of increasing expected blow magni-
tude is larger at low than at high startle magnitudes.
A.1.3. Assumption 3
Changing the utility of foregone opportunities linearly scales the
opportunity cost functions by a factor η
CnTOT rð Þ ¼ CR;d rð Þþ CB;d rð Þ
 
pþηCR;f rð Þþη CB;f rð Þ
 
p:
This generalises Assumption 3 from the main text.
A.1.4. Assumption 4
The relative increase in opportunity startle cost is smaller than the
relative decrease in expected opportunity cost of the blow when
startle magnitude is increased by a certain amount
d
dr
CR;f rð Þ

o
d
dr
CB;f rð Þ
 
p

:
d
dr
CR;f rð Þ40:
d
dr
CB;f rð Þ
 
po0:
Again, this generalises Assumption 4 from the main text. From
this assumption, it follows that for all ror0:
CR;f rð Þþ CB;f rð Þ
 
p4CR;f r0ð Þþ CB;f r0ð Þ
 
p:
A.2. Impact of increasing expected blow magnitude
When we increase the expected blow magnitude, the global
minimiser for CnTOT , r
n
0, must be larger than the current minimiser
for CTOT, r0.
Proof. Assume ror0. We can expand the total cost for the new
expected blow magnitude (star notation indicates the situation
with increased expected blow magnitude):
CnTOT rð Þ ¼ CR rð Þþ CB rð Þ
 
pn ¼ CR rð Þþ CB rð Þ
 
pþ CB rð Þ
 
pn  CB rð Þ
 
p
¼ CTOT rð Þþ CB rð Þ
 
pn  CB rð Þ
 
p: □
r0 is a global minimiser, so CTOT rð Þ4CTOT r0ð Þ for all rar0. Hence
CTOT rð Þþ CB rð Þ
 
pn  CB rð Þ
 
p4CTOT r0ð Þþ CB rð Þ
 
pn  CB rð Þ
 
p:
Because of Assumption 2:
CTOT r0ð Þþ CB rð Þ
 
pn  CB rð Þ
 
p4CTOT r0ð Þþ CB r0ð Þ
 
pn  CB r0ð Þ
 
p:
To summarise
ror0 ) CnTOT rð Þ4CnTOT r0ð Þ:
This means that no ror0 can be a global miminiser for CTOT.
Therefore the new global minimiser must be some rn0Zr0.
A.3. Impact of increased opportunity cost
When we increase opportunity cost, the new global minimiser
for CnTOT , r
n
0, must be larger than the current minimiser for CTOT, r0.
Proof. Assume ror0. We can expand the total cost for the new
opportunity cost (star notation indicates the situation with
increased opportunity cost), using Assumption 3 with η41
CnTOT rð Þ ¼ CR;d rð Þþ CB;d rð Þ
 
pþC
n
R;f rð Þþ CnB;f rð Þ
D E
p
¼ CTOT rð Þþ η1
 
CR;f rð Þþ η1
 
CB;f rð Þ
 
p
4CTOT r0ð Þþ η1
 
CR;f rð Þþ CB;f rð Þ
 
p
	 

:
4CTOT r0ð Þþ η1
 
CR;f r0ð Þþ CB;f r0ð Þ
 
p
	 

¼ CnTOT r0ð Þ; □
From Assumption 4, and because η41. To summarise
ror0 ) CnTOT rð Þ4CnTOT r0ð Þ:
This means that no ror0 can be a global miminiser for CTOT.
Therefore the new global minimiser must be some rn0Zr0.
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